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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913 to 1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion
of significant and often controversial issues currently before the legal
community. Former Tyrrell Williams Lecturers include some of the nation's
foremost legal scholars, judges, public servants, and practicing attorneys.
James 0. Freedman is President of Dartmouth College. He was
previously President of the University of Iowa and Dean of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School. President Freedman received his A.B. from
Harvard College and his LL.B. from Yale Law School. He clerked for
Thurgood Marshall, then a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, from 1962-1963. President Freedman delivered the
1994 Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on the campus of Washington
University in St. Louis on February 16, 1994.
THURGOOD MARSHALL: MAN OF CHARACTER
JAMES 0. FREEDMAN
It is a pleasure to join you today to deliver this year's Tyrrell Williams
Memorial Lecture. As a former law school dean, I have long admired
Washington University's School of Law, and I have especially rejoiced in
its fortunes since my good friend Dan Ellis became its dean.
I want to use this opportunity to talk of Thurgood Marshall. In the years
ahead, significant volumes of biography and history will undoubtedly
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enlarge our understanding of his skill as an advocate and his stature as a
judge. I want, instead, to speak of Justice Marshall as a man of character.
In 1742, Henry Fielding, one of the first great English novelists, began
Joseph Andrews with the sentence, "It is a trite but true observation, that
examples work more forcibly on the mind than precepts: and if this be just
in what is odious and blameable, it is more strongly so in what is amiable
and praise-worthy."'
In calling attention to the power of example to shape our respect for
human achievement, Fielding performs an important service. He reminds
us that exemplary lives matter. For me-as for the thousands of people,
young and old, white and black, from all walks of life, who filed through
the Great Hall of the Supreme Court when the Justice's body lay in state
in January 1993-the example of Thurgood Marshall as a person of
character does truly matter and carries extraordinary power.
There are doubtless those who worked with Thurgood Marshall whose
lives were not changed by that experience. But I have yet to meet one. All
of us-his law clerks, his associates at the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and his colleagues at the Justice Department, on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and on the United
States Supreme Court-were marked indelibly by Justice Marshall's
idealism and courage, his compassion and humanity, his craftsmanship and
wit. The force of his moral example changed our lives utterly, and in ways
that have made us better citizens and more reflective lawyers.
If this nation had an equivalent to Plutarch's Lives-a set of commentar-
ies on men and women who had lived instructive and noble lives-an essay
on Thurgood Marshall would surely be included. It would capture and
memorialize the essential qualities of Marshall's character-his physical
courage, his intellectual brilliance and professional expertise, his moral
strength, and his utter disregard for fame and wealth. It would explore,
above all, the beliefs that anchored his lifetime's commitment to racial and
social justice.
In his own Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture in 1967, entitled Law and
the Quest for Equality, Thurgood Marshall argued that the history of the
litigation leading up to Brown v. Board of Education2 indicated "that law
can not only respond to social change but can initiate it, and that lawyers,
1. HENRY FIELDING, JOSEPH ANDREws 39 (R.F. Brissenden ed., Penguin Books 1977) (1742).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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through their everyday work in the courts, may become social reformers."3
Indeed, he went further in stating that "[l]awyers have a duty in addition
to that of representing their clients; they have a duty to [re]present the
public, to be social reformers in however small a way."4 That lecture states
the credo of a career.
Thurgood Marshall was the child of a pragmatic American liberalism. He
was an idealist who believed deeply in the rule of the law, in the power of
government to improve the social and economic conditions of its citizens,
and in the promise of the Declaration of Independence. He knew that
idealism was the most certain foundation of immortality. Idealists are not
perfect, but their examples endure.
In The Souls of Black Folk, published in 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois argued,
in an oft-quoted passage, that the central issue for American blacks was the
"racial two-ness" that lies at the heart of their identity.' "One ever feels his
two-ness," he wrote, "an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body . ... The
history of the American Negro is the history of this strife-this longing to
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and
truer self."6 Like Du Bois, Thurgood Marshall was fiercely proud to be an
American and fiercely proud to be a Negro. And for Marshall, as for Du
Bois, the complex fate of being an African-American was the overarching
challenge of his life.
Marshall's life is one of the great American stories. It is emblematic of
a heroic theme: a young man from modest circumstances, confronted by
racial discrimination and social hostility, contributes mightily, by the power
of his mind and the strength of his character, to the redemption of his
nation's highest ideals.
Born in Baltimore in 1908, the grandson of a freed slave and Union
soldier,7 Thurgood Marshall became one of the most important public
lawyers of the century (only Louis D. Brandeis belongs in his class) and
the first African-American to serve as a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Marshall was also the first Marylander appointed to the Court since Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney, author of the Dred Scott decision, which held that
3. Thurgood Marshall, Law and the Quest for Equality, Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture
(1967), in 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7.
4. Id. at 9.
5. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903).
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL 31 (1992).
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Negroes were not "citizens" and had no rights under the Constitution.'
Marshall's succession to the seat held by Justice Tom C. Clark, grandson
of a Confederate soldier, symbolized the slow playing out of our national
destiny.
Thurgood Marshall came from a proud and close-knit family; his was a
privileged background, compared to many African-Americans at the
beginning of the century. His mother, Norma Marshall, was a college-
educated elementary-school teacher. His father, William Canfield Marshall,
was a Pullman car porter and, later, a country-club steward at an all-white
yacht club on Chesapeake Bay.9
From his parents he derived a sense of identity, of self-worth, of destiny.
He learned from them not to be bitter in the face of racial discrimination
and to judge people, white and black, by their character and their
achievements. Marshall loved repeating his father's remark, "[Son, if
a]nyone ever calls you [a] 'nigger,' you not only got my permission to
fight him-you got my orders to fight him."'" On a number of occasions,
Marshall carried out those orders. A democratic American with a small "d,"
Marshall was not a respecter of rank. When he was introduced to Britain's
Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh asked, "Do you care to hear my
opinion of lawyers?" Justice Marshall, mimicking the superior tones of the
royal accent, replied with a disarming smile, "Only if you care to hear my
opinion of princes.""
After Marshall was graduated from public high school in Baltimore, his
mother pawned-and did not reclaim-her wedding and engagement rings
so that he could go to college. 2 He followed his brother, Aubrey, to
Lincoln University in Chester, Pennsylvania. Known as the "black
Princeton" because many of its faculty were Princeton graduates, Lincoln
was the nation's oldest all-black college. Among Marshall's classmates
were the poet Langston Hughes, the musician Cab Calloway, and Kwame
Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana. 3
Having received his degree from Lincoln, Marshall was rebuffed in his
efforts to attend the all-white University of Maryland Law School-a ten-
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
9. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 35-36.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Elena Kagan, For Justice Marshall, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1126-27 (1993).
12. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 42.
13. Id. at 43.
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minute trolley ride from his home.1 4 Instead, he was forced to commute
to Howard Law School in Washington, D.C., where he was graduated in
1933 as valedictorian of his class."
It was at Howard that he met the most important mentor of his life,
Charles Hamilton Houston, the law school's Harvard-educated dean.
Houston impressed upon Marshall the obligation of eliminating segregation
and taught him that lawyers are either "social engineers" or "parasites." 6
Many years later, Marshall conferred a high compliment upon Houston by
describing him as "the engineer of it all."
Marshall declined a graduate fellowship at Harvard Law School in order
to enter private practice in Baltimore.17 At twenty-four, it was time to
support himself and begin his life's work of fighting segregation. In one of
his first cases after law school, working in collaboration with Houston and
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), he brought suit to compel the University of Maryland Law
School to enroll its first African-American student."8 Winning the case,
Marshall said, was "sweet revenge."' 9
Despite this early success, Marshall's years at the Baltimore bar were
difficult ones. The Depression made it virtually impossible for him to earn
a living. With paying clients few and far between, he threw himself into
community activities, including those of the NAACP, in order to establish
his reputation as a lawyer.2"
Houston cautioned Marshall not to neglect the development of his own
private practice for the work he was doing for the NAACP on the side.2"
But the advice was to no avail. Marshall's attention and talents were
increasingly captured by the cases he was handling for the NAACP. In
1935 Marshall told Houston, "Personally, I would not give up these cases
here in Maryland for anything in the world, but at the same time there is
no opportunity to get down to really hustling for business."22
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 48.
16. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATiON AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 128 (1976).
17. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 69.
18. Id. at 78.
19. Id. at 90.
20. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950, at 45 (1987).
21. Id. at 46.
22. Id. at 45.
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Marshall began to cast around for other sources of income. He applied
to teach at Howard Law School, and in September 1936 he wrote to
Houston, who by then had become the legal director of the NAACP, that
"something must be done about money. 2' During the prior six months,
Marshall had earned less than $200 from his NAACP work, and this was
virtually his entire income for the period.24 When Marshall asked that he
be paid a monthly retainer of $150 for his NAACP work, Houston
suggested that Marshall instead join him on the legal staff of the national
NAACP in New York.' Thus, under circumstances that were hardly
auspicious, Marshall moved to New York in October 1936 and began to
work full-time with the NAACP 26-- an association from which history
would be made. Marshall now had the momentous opportunity to ally his
formidable talents with an idea whose time had come.
Houston and Marshall complemented each other in styles, strengths, and
personalities. Two biographers of Marshall, Michael D. Davis and Hunter
R. Clark, have written: "Houston was low-key, well organized, formal in
his demeanor .... Thurgood was the gregarious extrovert, a backslapper
who quickly won friends. Houston was smart. Marshall was shrewd.
Houston was the better writer, Marshall the better speaker, lacing his
conversations with humor, logic, [and] salty and streetwise lan-
guage ... "27 Two years after joining the NAACP staff full-time, in
1938, when Houston retired, Thurgood Marshall, at age thirty, became chief
counsel of the NAACP,2" which later would establish its legal division as
a separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and. Educational Fund,
Inc.
When Houston had offered Marshall the job at the NAACP, he had
warned that extensive traveling would be required and that some of the
travel would be dangerous.29 He was right on both counts. During those
years-before jet planes or the interstate highway system-Marshall
traveled an average of 60,000 miles a year, mostly across the South, trying
cases and establishing a network of lawyers-white and black-who were
willing to take civil rights cases.30 Danger was always close at hand. He
23. Id.
24. TUsHNET, supra note 20, at 47.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 47.
27. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 103.
28. Id. at 105.
29. Id. at 98.
30. Id. at 21, 103.
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frequently was escorted by armed black guards.3 In undertaking the
defense of criminal cases throughout the South, Marshall demonstrated one
of the significant components of his character: physical courage.
Marshall often told of the time when he was waiting for a train in a
small Mississippi town where he had investigated a lynching. Hungry, he
decided to "'put my civil rights in my back pocket and go to the back door
of the kitchen [of a local restaurant] and see if I could buy a sandwich,' he
recalled. 'And while I was kibitzing myself to do that, this white man came
up beside me in plain clothes with a great big pistol on his hip. And he
said, "Nigger boy, what are you doing here?" And I said, "Well, I'm
waiting for the train to Shreveport." And he said, "There's only one more
train that comes through here, and that's the four o'clock, and you'd better
be on it because the sun is never going down on a live nigger in this
town .... Marshall concluded: "'Guess what? I was on that train.'
32
Another component of Marshall's character was his respect for intellect.
He was a man who appreciated intellectuals. From the beginning of his
career, he eagerly enlisted the talents of individuals more learned than
practicing lawyers could hope to be. He said, "I never hesitated to pick
other people's brains-brains I didn't have."33
The names of those members of the academic world who assisted him
in the years leading up to Brown v. Board of Education is an honor roll of
outstanding scholars, including Erwin N. Griswold, Walter Gellhorn,
Charles L. Black, Jr., Louis H. Pollak, John Hope Franklin, C. Vann
Woodward, Robert K. Carr, and Kenneth B. Clark. In addition, Marshall
had an uncanny ability to recognize legal talent. The lawyers with whom
he worked over the years included Robert L. Carter, Constance Baker
Motley, and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, all of whom went on to
distinguished careers as federal judges, as well as William T. Coleman, Jr.
and Jack Greenberg.34
But Marshall's special genius lay in his ability to apply the learning of
intellectuals from many fields in ways that advanced his cause dramatically.
The most famous example of Marshall's practice of bringing the scholar-
ship of others to bear upon legal argument was his use of Gunnar Myrdal's
comprehensive study of the Negro in the United States, An American
31. Id. at 107-08.
32. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1217, 1219 (1992).
33. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 109.
34. Id. at 20-21, 28, 336.
14931994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
1494 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Dilemma.35
Published in 1944, Myrdal's book made a stunning impression upon
American policymakers. It demonstrated that segregation was not only
devastating to the black minority, which lived in fear of harsh and arbitrary
treatment, but was also deleterious to the white majority, which experienced
a profound sense of moral guilt over the undeserved advantages and
privileges that the accident of their race afforded them. By emphasizing the
tension between the destructive impact of racial segregation upon black
character and culture, and the nobility of America's professed ideals of
liberty, justice, and equality, Myrdal's book provided essential tactical
support for undermining the doctrine of "separate but equal."36
Marshall's reliance on Myrdal's work proved to be an inspired decision.
Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion37 held that racial segregation in the public schools was unconstitution-
al. And the decision cited An American Dilemma for the proposition that
separate schools are inherently unequal.38 As Richard Kluger has written
in Simple Justice, Brown was "nothing short of a reconsecration of
American ideals."39
Surely Brown v. Board of Education was the crowning achievement of
Marshall's career-either before his service on the Supreme Court or after.
Had his legal career ended at that point, Marshall would have earned an
important place in American history. Already he had done more than
perhaps any other citizen-with the towering exception of Abraham
Lincoln-to address the American dilemma of relations between the races.
But Marshall went on to serve with distinction as a member of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as Solicitor General of the
United States, and for twenty-four years as a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. 0
Marshall came to prominence at a moment when the explosion of new
media of communications had fueled American society's growing
preoccupation with fame. Marshall's strength of character was such that he
never confused fame -or, for that matter, money-with achievement. The
35. Id. at 137-38. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
36. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 138.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Id. at 495n.11.
39. KLUGER, supra note 16, at 710.
40. Marshall served on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals from 1961 to 1965, as Solicitor
General from 1965 to 1967, and on the Supreme Court from 1967 to 1991.
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desire "to live in the minds of others," as Samuel Johnson said, has always
been intense, but it was most particularly television that confused celebrity
with authority and made it possible for a person to become, in Daniel J.
Boorstin's phrase, "known for his well-knownness," rather than for
accomplishments that warrant enduring recognition.41
It is important to observe that Thurgood Marshall's remarkable
achievements and professional eminence came, in large part, precisely
because he had no desire to be famous for the sake of being famous. At
one time, he was perhaps the most famous lawyer in the United States. His
picture appeared on the cover of Time magazine.42 The press called him
"Mr. Civil Rights."43 Yet Marshall's fame neither went to his head nor
deflected his vision. He knew that neither fame nor fortune could provide
nourishment sufficient to sustain his idealism.
Marshall's commitment was to the public profession of the law, not to
the acquisition of wealth. When President Kennedy nominated him to the
Court of Appeals in 1961, his salary at the Legal Defense Fund was
$18,000. When President Johnson nominated him as Solicitor General in
1965, he accepted a reduction in salary, from $33,000 to $28,500, and,
perhaps more importantly, relinquished the life tenure of a federal judge.'
The financial risks he took were not insignificant ones for a man concerned
with supporting properly a wife and two young sons.
If President Johnson regarded service as Solicitor General as preparation
for an eventual appointment as the first black Justice of the Supreme Court,
Marshall himself had no direct knowledge of Johnson's intentions. And he
surely appreciated that the vagaries of history and politics might prevent
Johnson from carrying through on any intention he may then have had to
name him to the Court. Despite the loss of life tenure and a reduction in
salary, Marshall accepted appointment as Solicitor General because his
sense of responsibility to the President-and perhaps of historical
destiny--outweighed his interest in personal security. Less than two years
later, President Johnson, on June 13, 1967, nominated Marshall to the
Supreme Court.' In making the historic announcement, Johnson said: "I
believe it is the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and
41. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 57 (1964).
42. TIME, Sept. 19, 1955.
43. Janet Alexander Cooper, TM, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1229 (1992).
44. Id. at 244-45.
45. Id. at 265.
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the right place."46
Justice Marshall brought unique qualifications to the Court. He was its
only member who had specialized in the practice of criminal law, let alone
defended dozens of men for murder and other capital crimes. He was its
only member who had personally faced racial discrimination, let alone
experienced the fear of being lynched when trying cases in small Southern
towns. He was its only member who had successfully argued dozens of
cases before the Court, let alone achieved landmark victories that expanded
the meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
These unique qualifications, which helped to define Marshall's character,
often found compassionate expression in his constitutional views. As
Professor Carol Steiker of Harvard Law School has said of Marshall, "He
naturally understood the position of the outsider, the underdog, and the
silenced, and he gave that position his powerful voice. ' 47 Justice Marshall
carved out a special place on the Court as a resolute defender of the
constitutional rights of minorities, women, criminal defendants, the poor,
the disenfranchised, the powerless.
Thus, when the Court held, in United States v. Kras,48 that pauper
debtors had to pay a fifty-dollar fee to file for relief in bankruptcy,
Marshall took angry exception to the assertion that such debtors could save
up the fee by forgoing a weekly movie or giving up two packs of cigarettes
each week.49 "It may be easy for some people to think that weekly
savings of less than $2 are no burden," Marshall wrote, "[b]ut no one who
has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to
the margin of survival many of them are."
50
I do not breach a law clerk's obligation of confidentiality in recounting
here a story, more than thirty years after the fact, that describes one of the
most powerful lessons that Judge Marshall taught me. In drafting a factual
statement in a case in which an injured longshoreman had sued the owner
of a cargo ship for unseaworthiness, I quoted from the plaintiffs halting
testimony at trial. Because the testimony was ungrammatical, I followed the
law review practice of placing the diacritical word "[sic]" after several
46. Id. at 266.
47. Carol Steiker, Speech at the Tribute to Thurgood Marshall at Faneuil Hall, Boston,
Massachusetts (Feb. 22, 1993).
48. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
49. Id. at 458-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sentences. Judge Marshall took me to task. The use of the word "[sic]," he
said sternly, might seem a useful bit of scholarly apparatus to a precocious
law clerk, but it was a refined form of insult to the unlettered plaintiff and
served no decisional purpose whatsoever. What was the point of that
gratuitous put-down? Of course, he was right.
Justice Marshall brought to the United States Supreme Court a spe-
cial-indeed, a unique-perspective. He never forgot the mean realities of
life at the street level. Alone among the Justices, as Paul Gerwirtz wrote,
Justice Marshall "knew what police stations were like, what rural Southern
life was like, what the streets of New York were like, what the trial courts
were like, what death sentences were like, what being black in America
was like-and he knew what it felt like to be at risk as a human being."
5
'
In the crucible of poverty, physical danger, injustice, and racial discrimina-
tion that taught him these mean realities, Marshall's character had been
forged. The concerns of the outsider were the concerns of his lifetime. He
was a public interest lawyer before that term came into popular use.
Conversely, Marshall understood the opportunities he could give to
minority lawyers by virtue of his position as a Justice of the Supreme
Court. True to his character, as he rose, he never failed to lift others.
During his twenty-four years of service, Marshall chose more black and
minority law clerks than any other Justice, and many of these men and
women now serve on the faculties of the nation's leading law schools.
He also brought to the Court a special brand of sardonic, often ironic,
wit. Marshall's humor was a serious manifestation of his personality and
inseparable from his strength of character. His humor was, among other
things, a coping strategy; rather than a means of denying the bleakness of
reality, it was a way of dealing with it. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Marshall's closest friend on the Court, clearly recognized that Marshall's
personal stories caused his colleagues to "confront walks of life we had
never known." 2
Thus, he would resist a law clerk's assertion that he had to agree to a
particular position by responding, "[Boy, t]here are only two things I have
to do: stay black and die."53 Similarly, he delighted in telling and retelling
the story of his response to a cantankerous Southern judge who asked him,
"What do you want from this court?" Said Marshall, "Anything I can get,
your honor."
51. Paul Gerwitz, Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 13, 14 (1991).
52. ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 20 (1992).
53. Kagan, supra note 11, at 1128.
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One of the most poignant aspects of Justice Marshall's character was the
maturity with which he negotiated periods of profound disappointment as
they alternated with periods of sublime satisfaction. For example, the years
leading up to Brown v. Board of Education must have been ones of
accelerating, if cautious, anticipation. Although he and his colleagues knew
that the constitutional abolition of "separate but equal" was not inevitable,
they also must have sensed that it was, at that time, more likely to occur
than ever previously had been the case.
Marshall could look back on his days as head of the NAACP's legal
effort and see a long string of landmark victories. In Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada,54 the Supreme Court ordered the integration of the
University of Missouri Law School. In Morgan v. Virginia,55 the Court
outlawed segregation on interstate buses. In Shelley v. Kraemer,5 6 the
Court barred judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants intended
to prevent the sale of houses to blacks, Jews, or members of other minority
groups. And in Sweatt v. Painter57 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents," the Court began the process of chipping away at the doctrine
of "separate but equal."
Although Marshall appreciated that Brown v. Board of Education was a
decision of surpassing historic significance, he often stated that the decision
in Smith v. Allwright,9 which held unconstitutional the Democratic white
primary in Texas, addressed a related and perhaps equally important issue:
the right to vote. Because of his deep commitment to the democratic
process, Marshall placed a high value on securing for blacks the right to
vote. Although the Fifteenth Amendment had given black males the right
to vote in 1870,60 no Southern blacks had in fact been permitted to vote
before 1920, and as late as the 1940 presidential election, only 2.5 percent
of eligible black voters voted in the South." When poll taxes, literacy
tests, and grandfather clauses did not stop blacks from voting, threats and
other forms of intimidation usually did. "Without the ballot," Marshall said,
"you have no citizenship, no status, no power in this country."
Marshall's efforts, and those of William H. Hastie (who would later
54. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
55. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
56. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
57. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
58. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
59. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
61. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 112.
[VOL. 72:1487
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/2
TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL LECTURE
become the first African-American appointed to a federal appeals court),62
to secure the voting rights of blacks forever changed the profile of city
halls, state capitols, and governors' mansions. By 1993, more than 8,000
African-Americans held elected positions in the United States-including
those of Governor, United States Senator, and United States Representa-
tive--compared with approximately 1,500 in 1970.
On May 17, 1954, Marshall experienced the rare satisfaction of
prevailing in perhaps the most momentous case of the century. However,
the heady exhilaration of winning Brown was followed, during the next
several years, by the discouraging necessity of litigating the meaning of the
Court's pronouncement that its ruling be effectuated "with all deliberate
speed."63 The massive resistance mounted by large cities and rural
communities alike, with the demagogic support of Southern governors, was
tremendously dispiriting.'
A similar pattern occurred in Justice Marshall's tenure on the Supreme
Court. The Court that Marshall joined, it seems clear in retrospect, was an
especially distinguished one. During his early years, he served with
colleagues who were his intellectual and professional equals. The Court's
senior members were among the most respected justices in American
history-Earl Warren, Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, John Marshall
Harlan, and William J. Brennan, Jr. Those were the years in which
Marshall was able to take gratification from his unparalleled capacity for
craftsmanship. Like another great judge, Learned Hand, he had long ago
learned that "it is as craftsmen that we get our satisfactions and our
pay."65 Those were also the years in which many of the views he had long
held became the law of the land. Those were his halcyon days.
That sense of professional gratification changed with the election of
President Nixon in 1968 and the appointment in the years that followed of
a number of Justices-including two Chief Justices, Warren E. Burger and
William H. Rehnquist-whose views were opposed to Marshall's in
virtually every area that mattered to him most. As the membership of the
Court became more conservative, he found himself increasingly in dissent,
especially on issues such as a woman's right to privacy, which he
supported, and capital punishment, which he opposed.
Still, with the steady purpose of a man of character devoted to causes he
62. Id. at 224.
63. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
64. KLuGER, supra note 16, at 710-11.
65. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (1958).
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regarded as proper in principle, he persevered. Following the appointments
of Antonin Scalia in 1986 and Anthony Kennedy in 1988, Marshall's
despair at the direction the Court was taking deepened. It became more
painful with the retirement in 1990 of Justice Brennan, Marshall's closest
ally and dearest friend.
Gradually, Marshall had become accustomed to-but not contented
with-writing dissents.6 He often said that the first question he asked
prospective law clerks was whether they would be satisfied with writing
dissents. "I agree with that old saying," he said, "that 'I love peace but I
adore a riot.' You've got to be angry to write a dissent."
Marshall saw the unanimous and resounding decisions such as Brown
give way to innumerable five-to-four and six-to-three decisions, in which
he often was in the minority. For example, the Court's consensus on school
integration broke down in Milliken v. Bradley,67 which rejected, by a vote
of five-to-four, a multidistrict integration plan that covered not only Detroit
but its predominantly white suburban communities as well. In a compelling
dissent, Marshall argued that "the Court today takes a giant step backwards.
... Our Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to remedy
separate and unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn
together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live
together. ' 68 He continued:
Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence are not
quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But just as the inconvenience of
some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the rights of others, so public
opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court
from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in this case.
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that
we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equaljustice than it is the product of neutral principles of law. 9
In City of Mobile v. Bolton,70 the Court upheld, by a vote of six-to-
three, an at-large system for electing city commissioners-a system that
diluted black voting strength and had the practical result of electing only
whites. Marshall dissented, arguing that the discriminatory impact alone of
66. DAvIs & CLARK, supra note 7, at 7.
67. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
68. Id. at 782, 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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the new voting system was sufficient to violate the Constitution.7' He
warned: "If this Court refuses to honor our long-recognized principle that
the Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination,'... it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect
political channels of seeking redress."72
Marshall's deepest convictions were aroused in cases involving the
constitutionality of capital punishment. In Gregg v. Georgia,73 the Court
held, by a vote of seven-to-two, that the death penalty did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Only Justice
Brennan shared Marshall's view that the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment per se and, therefore, always unconstitutional.74 In
opinion after opinion, Marshall noted that death is irrevocable75 and makes
rehabilitation impossible.76 The question, he said, "is not simply whether
capital punishment is a deterrent, but whether it is a better deterrent than
life imprisonment. '77 He could find no such evidence. He wrote, "At
times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society's
abhorrence of [a criminal] act. But the Eighth Amendment is our insulation
from our baser selves. 78
The rise of "reverse discrimination" cases was hardly less frustrating.
When the Court issued its decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,79 permitting a state university to consider race among
other factors in making admissions decisions, Marshall concurred in the
result; but he did not accept that part of the Court's reasoning that held
unconstitutional a separate admissions program for disadvantaged
minorities.80 He wrote:
[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious
and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State
acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe
that this same Constitution stands as a barrier."'
71. Id. at 103-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
73. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 230-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1319 (1973).
76. Furman, 408 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 344-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
79. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80. Id. at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id.
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The acuteness of Marshall's pain and frustration comes through poignantly
in his opinion in Bakke. Marshall continued:
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in
degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of
slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the
law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting
pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color, he never
even made it into the pot."2
More than sixty years after Marshall had begun his legal career, that
statement remains, alas, painfully true.
One notes with aching sadness how large a proportion of Justice
Marshall's twenty-four years on the Supreme Court was devoted to
dissenting on the issues of greatest moment to him. Only the support of
Justice Brennan consistently provided him ideological comfort-and the
hopeful glimmer of eventual vindication by history-against the wrong-
headed direction he believed the Court was taking.
In a moving tribute to Justice Marshall upon his retirement, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor described once asking him how he avoided being
despondent, given all the injustices he had witnessed during his lifetime.83
He told her the story of how he and Charles Houston had traveled to
Loudon County, Virginia, to represent a black man accused of murdering
a wealthy white woman and her white maid. 4 After Marshall and Houston
unsuccessfully challenged the exclusion of blacks from the jury, the man
was convicted of murder by the all-white jury and sentenced to life in
prison." "'You know something is wrong with the government's case,"'
Justice Marshall told O'Connor, "'when a Negro only gets life for
murdering a white woman. ' ' 86 Marshall added, "'I just don't believe that
guy got a fair shake. But what are you going to do?... There are only two
choices in life: stop and go on. You tell me, what would you pick?"'8'
He once told a reunion of his law clerks, in a moment I will remember
for the rest of my life,
[T]he goal of a true democracy such as ours, explained simply, is that any
baby born in these United States, even if he is born to the blackest, most
82. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. O'Connor, supra note 32, at 1219.
84. Id. at 1219-20.
85. Id. at 1220.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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illiterate, most unprivileged Negro in Mississippi, is, merely by being born
and drawing his first breath in this democracy, endowed with the exact same
rights as a child born to a Rockefeller.
Of course it's not true. Of course it never will be true. But I challenge
anybody to tell me that it isn't the type of goal we should try to get to as fast
as we can.
83
His remarks reflected his sober skepticism, held until the very end of his
life, about whether American society was yet prepared to grant equal rights
and equal opportunity to minorities. While he retained a deep faith in the
guarantees of the Constitution and in the ideals of the Declaration of
Independence, he also held serious doubts about the nation's commitment
to attaining those guarantees and ideals.
In 1987, as the nation was celebrating the bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, Justice Marshall spoke to the annual seminar of the San
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association. He reminded his
audience that the Constitution "was defective from the start, requiring
several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to
attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the
individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental
today."9 He bluntly addressed the hypocrisy of the first three words of
the preamble, "We the People."'" The compromise in Philadelphia, he
said, created an unprincipled "contradiction between guaranteeing liberty
and justice to all, and denying both to Negroes."92 Moreover, "[w]omen
did not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years."93
Although he refused to celebrate the wisdom and sense of justice of the
Framers, Justice Marshall praised the evolutionary manner in which the
Constitution has remained a living document, especially by virtue of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 He pointed out the striking role
that legal principles have played in "determining the condition of Negroes"
who "were enslaved by law, emancipated by law, disenfranchised and
88. Thurgood Marshall, Address at the Annual Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 5, 1986),
in 115 F.R.D. 349, 354 (1987).
89. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Address
at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), in
101 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Reflections].
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 4-5.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 2, 5.
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segregated by law; and, finally, they have begun to win equality by
law."95 The progress that blacks have achieved was not the result of the
Founding Fathers, Marshall said, but of those men and women who came
later. "'We the People' no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong
to the Framers. It belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated
notions of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to better
them. '9 6 For himself, Marshall said, "I plan to celebrate the bicentennial
of the Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of Rights and
the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights."
97
These sober reflections were doubtless not what his audience had
expected, but Marshall's candor reflected the experience of a lifetime, as
well as his unyielding faith that the Constitution could be made into a
better document than the one framed by the Founding Fathers. By calling
attention to the Constitution's defects at a time of often uncritical
celebration of its virtues, Marshall made a case that virtually no contempo-
rary had thought to make-perhaps because none possessed the strength of
character that he did, and none had reflected upon it so profoundly as he
had.
As the end of his life drew near, Justice Marshall's faith in the power of
the Court to achieve racial and economic justice continued to falter. On
July 4, 1992, six months before his death, Justice Marshall was given the
Philadelphia Liberty Medal, which carried a prize of $100,000, in
recognition of his contributions in the pursuit of liberty of conscience and
freedom from oppression and deprivation.9" His speech that day, delivered
at Independence Hall, was a ringing assertion and reaffirmation of the
views of a lifetime:
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant memories...
and that liberty and equality were just around the bend. I wish I could say
that America has come to appreciate diversity and to see and accept
similarity.
But as I look around, I see not a nation of unity but of division-Afro and
white, indigenous and immigrant, rich and poor, educated and illiterate. Even
many educated whites and successful Negroes have given up on integration
and lost hope in equality....
We cannot play ostrich. Democracy cannot flourish amid fear. Liberty
95. Reflections, supra note 89, at 5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JusTics THURfOOD
MARSHALL 452 (1993).
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cannot bloom amid hate. Justice cannot take root amid rage.... We must go
against the prevailing wind. We must dissent from the indifference. We must
dissent from the apathy. We must dissent from the fear, the hatred and the
mistrust. We must dissent from a government that has left its young without
jobs, education, or hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and the
absence of moral leadership. We must dissent because America can do better,
because America has no choice but to do better.99
With his health failing, Justice Marshall's last days were sad ones. Yet
Marshall's tenacity and his determination to defend his view of the
Constitution-especially on such issues as capital punishment, privacy and
abortion, and the rights of minorities and the poor-did not falter. He
frequently told friends, "I was appointed for life, and I intend to serve out
my term."" ° But advancing age finally caused him to step down in June
of 1991. When asked how he wanted to be remembered, Marshall said, "He
did the best he could with what he had."''
Justice Marshall died on January 24, 1993. He was eighty-four. The
public response to his death-measured most dramatically by the eighteen
thousand persons, of all races and all backgrounds, who paid their final
respects to him in the Great Hall of the Supreme Court-is testimony to the
depth of his impact on the lives of ordinary Americans. At Justice
Marshall's funeral, held in Washington's National Cathedral, it was, to my
mind, William T. Coleman, Jr. who best captured Marshall's legacy.
"History will ultimately record," Coleman said, "that Mr. Justice Marshall
gave the cloth and linen to the work that Lincoln's untimely death left
undone."'0 2
As a result of his historic achievements, Thurgood Marshall changed the
face of America. Although the changes have not been so swift in recent
years as they were at the height of Marshall's career, progress will continue
and the direction is certain. In the end, that progress toward the achieve-
ment of equality for all will be Thurgood Marshall's greatest legacy.
Thurgood Marshall's life was a unique conjunction of person and place,
of talent and destiny. He was an American original, a man of character
whose contributions to the Republic redeemed its most cherished values.
99. Id. at 453-54.
100. See DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 7, at 3.
101. ROWAN, supra note 98, at 392.
102. Stephen Labalon, Thousands Fill Cathedral to Pay Tribute to Marshall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1993, at A16.
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